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NOTES  ON  THE  APRIL  25-27  CONFERENCE 
11  EUROPE  IN  THE  80's 11 
BY  WILLIAH  GAILLARD  #es~  1  !/a_, 
EUROPEAN  COJI:lMUNITIES  DELEGATION 
The  following  remarks  only reflect the views  of their author  and 
not necessarily the policy of  the  Commission of  the  European  Community. 
A  rather traditional atmosphere  and  approach  emerges  from  the 
proceedings of the 
11Europe  in the  80's
11  conference.  I  believe this 
feeling  is  linked to the fact that the  three countries  chosen  for 
close scrutiny,  the U.K.,  France  and  the Federal Republic  of  Germany, 
are the  kind of countries u.s.  experts  usually like to deal with:  they 
are culturally familiar,  politically stable and  internationally rather 
predictable.  If this conference  had  taken place  in the  1870's,  the 
1920's or the  SO's,  these  same  three nations would  have  been  on  the 
agenda. 
I  think  there is  a  need  for  the u.s.  to consider more  seriously 
the  European  situation as  a  whole  and  in particular the reality of  a 
European  Community  expanding  towards  the  south. 
The  southern European countries are  less culturally familiar,  less 
politically stable and  more  geopolitically fragile than their northern 
neighbors.  These characteristics at the  same  time  make  them  less 
convenient but more  useful  to watch  than  the U.K.,  France  and  the  FRG. 
Italy,  if one  takes  into account  the  enormous  impact of its 
underground  economy,  has  probably  today  a  larger GNP  than  the  U.K. 
Despite  the political turmoil it has  been experiencing since 1969, 
the  social  and  economic  fabric  of the country has  held  together much 
better than  expected.  Th.e  Italian economy,  although right now  showing 
signs  of distress,  has  a  much  stronger capacity for  expansion  and 
dynamism  than its British counterpart.  Italy,  before France  and  the 
F.R.G.,  was  a  pioneer  in economic  and  commercial detente with  the  Soviet 
Union  (i.e.  the Fiat-USSR of  the early 60s).  While  being over  90% 
dependent  on  foreign  sources of  energy,  Italy,  through its state-owned 
oil company,  ENI  (Ente  Nazionale  Idrocarburi)  has  been  in the  foreground 
since the late 1950s  of the partnership efforts between oil and  natural 
gas  consuming  countries  and oil and  gas  exporting countries. 
Italy's political system,  while displaying obvious  byzantine 
characteristics,  is more  flexible,  more  prone  to compromise,  more 
adaptable  to change  than  a  more  rigidly class-based  2  1/2-party system 
like the British one.  Also with its own  blend of private enterprise 
and  state-controlled economy,  Italy is a  rather attractive model  for 
developing countries  (perhaps  surprisingly so).  The  latest British 
diplomatic initiatives have  been  spectacular,  in particular the  handling 
of the  Zimbabwe  independence  settlement,  but  as  one  of  the participants 
to  the conference pointed out,  Britain does  not have  too  many  Zimbabwes 
left to play with. 2/ 
I  do  not believe that the  "Franco-German Axis"  will lose its 
grip on  Europe  in the  foreseeable  future  but  I  anticipate  a  shift in 
emphasis  towards  the mediterranean area.  It is in this very context 
that Italy could avail itself of  the weight of the  new  member  states 
(Greece,  Portugal,  and  Spain)  to  impose with French-and  West  German 
assent,  a  more  active policy,  in favor  of the Mediterranean areas  of the 
E.C.  and  towards  the Maghreb  and  the Machrek. 
As  I  pointed out repeatedly during  the  Reston  conference,  the 
enlargement of the  Community  toward  Greece  in 1981,  Spain  and  Portugal, 
probably  by  1983-84,  will represent  a  major  burden  for  the  9  at the 
political,  economic  and  social levels. 
At  the political level,  the  EC  institutions will become  heavier, 
more  cumbersome  to maneuver.  Threats of dilution will almost certainly 
become  very apparent.  Unanimity,  more  or less the rule  for all 
vital decisions  since  1965,  will be  more  difficult to reach as  national 
interests will become  more  heterogeneous  and  therefore  even  less 
compatible than  today.  From  a  European perspective,  one  can also point 
out that both Greece  (PASOK)  and  Portugal  (Communist  party,  fractions  in 
the  army)  have  organizations which  see  the  future  of these nations  in 
a  more  "third world"  context and  this will definitely slow  down  any 
process  of  further  integration that might  have  been  contemplated  by  the 
9.  I  would  not  underestimate either the Gaulist-like tendencies  of  some 
sectors of the Spanish center-right. 
From  a  U.S.  point of view,  I  would  think that the  3  new  countries 
(especially Spain  and  Greece,  but also Portugal  since  the  conservative 
government of Francisco  Sa  Carneiro may  not be eternal)  would  reinforce 
the French inspired  tendency which has  led Europe  on  an  increasingly 
independent course  on  foreign policy matters.  Just pushing  the matter 
a  bit you  could  have  the  following  situation in southern Europe  in the 
mid-80s.,  France:  Socialist-Giscardian coalition,  Italy:  Demo-Christian-
Socialist-Communist coalition,  Spain:  Socialist government,  Greece: 
PASOK  government,  Portugal:  Socialist government with outside Communist 
support.  Such  a  situation would,  all other things being equal, 
undoubtedly  lead southern Europe  to  a  situation of friendly  non-
alignment with  the U.S. 
Economically,  the regional disparity within  the  Community will be 
widened,  which,  in real  terms  means  a  sharp conflict between  those 
favoring agricultural  spending  and  those  inclined to  spend  on  social 
and  regional policies. 
These disparities between north  and  south  could  revive  the 
idea to create  a  "two-speed  Europe"  which  would  eventually lead to  a 
North-South  fracture threatening the very existence of the  EC  as  we 
know it today. 
When  the  Community  was  created in 1958,  the European  economy 
was  booming.  Integration strengthened this process  tremendously. 
Today  our  economies  are battered,  weak  and  structurally fragile.  By 
adding  3  "semi-developing"  countries  to the ailing  9  economies  one 
might already  delay substantially the  economic  recovery  of  the whole. 
Socially,  the enlargement also poses  some  problems,  particularly 
at the  level of the  EC  policy of  free  circulation of persons within 
the  Community.  With  high rates of unemployment  in northern Europe, 3/ 
it seems  very difficult for  the richer countries  to welcome  migrant 
workers  from  the  new  members.  This  situation could create  tough poli-
tical problems  between  north  and  south.  All  these  elements  are 
useful-to keep  in mind  if one wants  to fully understand  "Europe  in 
the  80s"  without overemphasizing what  is well-known,  familiar  and 
stable in  a  very  dynamic  region. 